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ABSTRACT
Metamorphic testing (MT) is a property-based software testing method which al-
leviates the oracle problem and enables test automation. The oracle problem refers
to the difficulty or high cost of deciding whether the output program of test cases
is correct. In this thesis we use MT to alleviate the oracle problem by testing code
obfuscators which perform code obfuscation tasks. Code obfuscation is a popular and
effective technique for protecting software code. Its key function is to transform a Pro-
gram Being Protected (PBP) to a Semantically-Equivalent Version (SEV ), such that
the SEV is difficult to reverse (de-compile) or understand; SEV and PBP must have
equivalent behaviour. Like compilers, obfuscators are critical applications because
incorrectly obfuscated code not only compromises the confidentiality of software, it
also cause serious and unexpected problems during the execution of SEV. However,
the oracle problem makes it difficult to test the functional correctness of obfuscators,
such deciding the equivalence between PBP and SEV. Although a lot of research into
testing compilers has been carried out, very little has been done on testing obfuscators.
In this research we use MT to test obfuscators in an automated fashion. The results
of experiments show that MT detected a number of previously unknown bugs in 4
real world obfuscators, including open source software, free software, and commercial
software.
In the second part of this thesis we conduct a case study on the characteristics of
good metamorphic test cases that are very good at detecting faults. MT is a property-
based testing strategy with properties known as metamorphic relations (MRs). For
a target program many MRs are usually identified, and many test cases are usually
generated for each MR. Testers must know how to prioritise the MRs and test cases
so that faults can be detected earlier. In this study we investigate the relationship
between fault-detection effectiveness and (dis)similarity between the initial and follow-
up test case executions which constitute a metamorphic test. The results of these
experiments confirm Cao et al.’s finding [10] [11] that the higher the dissimilarity, the
better the chance that a metamorphic test will detect a fault. This finding can be
used to prioritise MRs and test cases where test case coverage data are available or
can be estimated, such as in the context of regression testing.
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As technology continues to develop, more and more intelligent software is now used in
industries such as bank payments and space exploration. Software plays an important
role in our life but there are still negative effects such as vulnerabilities in the financial
system which increase the risk of payment and may cause inestimable costs. This is
why the quality of software is important and why software testing is receiving more
attention in current software development.
The goal of software testing is to “provide information about the quality of the test
item and any residual risk in relation to how much the test item has been tested; to
find defects in the test item prior to its release for use; and to mitigate the risks to the
stakeholders of poor product quality” [1]. Based on different phases of the software
cycle, a reasonable and effective test plan and test cases can be designed and used to
detect any fault in the program under test in order to verify the correctness of the
software. Thus, the effectiveness of software testing will determine the quality of the
software.
It is advisable to choose appropriate methods to test software because testing is a
1
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complex process and many testing methods are currently being applied. Depending
on the different aspects of testing there are many classifications, but based on the
structure and algorithm of the particular software, two basic approaches are currently
used to test software: black-box testing and white-box testing.
While both are useful, they do have different features. Black-box testing is also
called “specification-based testing in which the principal test basis is the external
inputs and outputs of the test item, commonly based on a specification, rather than
its implementation in source code or executable software” [1]. It is commonly used to
test software which focuses on its behaviour rather than its internal structure. Here the
possible inputs are tested and the actual output is compared to the output expected
from the specification to verify whether the actual output is correct. White-box testing
is used to validate whether there is any fault in the algorithms, the internal structure,
or the overall efficiency. White-box testing is also known as structural testing because
it is only concerned with the internal perspectives of the software. Black-box testing
and white-box testing should be designed to complement rather than replace each
other, and therefore the choice of which to apply should be based on the testing
requirements.
Testing can be done manually or automatically, each of which has benefits and dis-
advantages. In manual testing there are no tools or scripts, whereas with automation
testing, test cases are carried out using tools, scripts, and software. Manual testing is
carried out by humans, which is better when the requirements are not clear or there
are no guidelines, as with new products for example. However, manual testing is not
always reliable due to the limitations of human knowledge. When test cases are to
be used iteratively, automation testing is considered to be used because automation
testing is faster and less time is required to verify the outputs while the test cases and
scripts take longer to write. Automation testing is better when frequent repetition is
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required, although the maintenance costs are high. So the method of testing should
be based on their particular features and on the test resources.
Software testing can be classified as functional testing, performance testing, usabil-
ity testing, security testing, and compatibility testing, etc., but it can also include
isolated components, unit testing, and integration or system testing. However, re-
gardless of the method used, the primary aspects of software testing are test cases,
respective designs, selection, and execution. Here, testers verify correctness by com-
paring the actual output to the expected output, and if there is any difference, then a
failure is detected.
Normally the test cases for black-box testing can derive from the requirements or
specifications of the software. Many methods of test case design have been proposed
and applied [58] [67], such as Boundary Value Analysis (BVA), Equivalence Partition-
ing (EP) and Decision Table Testing, for white-box testing the Statement Coverage,
Branch Coverage, and Path Coverage. While testing is generally supported by large
numbers of test cases, the testing resources are not infinite to support every possible
test case, which is why the design and selection of test cases will be considered. It is
better to select some superior test cases from existing test cases because most of them
are used in the regression test stage [37] [54]. The goal is to prioritise the test cases
and choose the more effective test cases for further testing.
Testers will often use a test oracle [6] to decide whether a program has failures,
by comparing the actual output to the expected output, but the test oracle may not
always be available or cannot be practically applied. It is assumed that an oracle is
available for most situations, but when complicated numerical simulations, compilers,
or search engines are to be tested, the oracle is not always valid. Since it is difficult
and/or expensive to verify correctness, it is also called an oracle problem [6] [21] [44].
The reliability of existing test cases also pose a problem because designing an absolutely
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reliable test suite for a program is difficult, so its correctness can only be ensured by
executing all the test cases. Therefore we need better methods to understand the test
oracle problem and determine the reliability of test cases.
Metamorphic testing (MT) was introduced by Chen et al. [21] to alleviate the
oracle problem, but in test cases where failure cannot be detected, it is still useful
for future testing because it can be recombined to generate a new test case to test
the target program [49] [55]. The expected output of these new test cases can be
checked using the metamorphic relations (MRs) which exist between two or more
test cases and their expected outputs. If the expected output cannot be obtained
in advance, testers can then compare the outputs against the metamorphic relation
to obtain a result, but if the result does not satisfy the metamorphic relation, then
the implementation is incorrect. In MT, the program can be tested many times in
order to validate its correctness. MT is useful at alleviating the oracle problem and
it is also a technique for generating automation test cases. In practice, MT can also
be used as a complementary testing method in conjunction with conventional testing,
which will lead to faster fault detection [57]. Along with the development of software
testing techniques, more research results in the area of metamorphic testing are also
presented. In the ICSE International Workshop on Metamorphic Testing, more testing
in this area has been discussed to present novel ideas about metamorphic relations,
the application domain, and test case selection [7] [27] [61].
For instance, to test the sine function many metamorphic relationships can be
defined based on the domain knowledge of the trigonometric function method. For
sin(x), the metamorphic relations are defined as follows: sin(x) = sin(π − x), sin(x)
= sin(x + 2π), ..., etc.; the function is tested more than once based on these meta-
morphic relations but they are generated in the knowledge domain. Another example
is calculator testing, but calculating some complex expressions is very expensive, so
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MT can be used for testing and some simple MRs can be constructed. Moreover, the
exchange property can also be used to design a metamorphic relation to test target
functions such as a + b = b + a. The outputs on either side of this equality should be
the same; otherwise there is a failure, although more MRs can be designed according
to the properties of the calculator.
Like the oracle problem, selecting which test cases to carry out is another problem
because to increase coverage, many cases must be prepared, and sometimes testers do
not have enough time to run every case so they must priorities key cases, and this in
turn means knowing the fault-detecting capacity of each test case. Similarly, when MT
is used for testing, many test cases have the same metamorphic relation or more than
one metamorphic relation has been created for the same property. This is why software
testing has become an expensive but necessary activity in the development of modern
software and why software testers or software engineers must design test inputs and
oracles based on their specifications or requirements. Furthermore, expected outputs
are also used to determine whether a test passed or failed, but as the software industry
has developed, some parts cannot be tested or the tests are very expensive because
the expected outputs such as big data modules, machine learning, compilers, and
obfuscators are difficult to find.
In industry testing, testing “non-testable” programs [66] and is subject to limita-
tions using conventional testing methods such as compiler testing. Moreover, identify-
ing the oracle problem is difficult and expensive, as is automation testing, and since
human intelligence and experience is needed to validate the non-testable programs, it
can be unreliable and prone to error. This is why many techniques are used to alleviate
these testing problems [43] [68] .
Code transformation software is a type of non-testable program which aims to
transform source code based on specific methods. The common software used here
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are compilers and code obfuscators. A source code is compiled by a compiler to an
executable binary file where the code obfuscator can transform the source code into
a confused condition, and while they have different features, they both change the
original source code. Several methods have been proposed to validate the correctness
of compilers [43] [68], and likewise, the quality of code obfuscators is also receiving
more attention.
Code obfuscation is an important part of software development, so it is used in
many domains [36] [38], although extensive testing is needed to ensure that the code
obfuscation software and code obfuscators are correct [52]. This means the quality
and correctness of the obfuscator is important because any fault may result in a faulty
source code. If errors exist in a code obfuscator, the original semantics of a program
can be changed and may even result in a non-executable program. I Obfuscated
code is difficult to check because it is unreadable, so potential errors can cause the
programmer a lot of angst; this is why having a correct code obfuscator is crucial to
software development. Finally, how to verify the correctness of code obfuscators will
also be discussed in this thesis.
1.2 Research Goals
This research has two main goals:
The first goal is to investigate whether a metamorphic testing technique is effective
at code obfuscator testing and attempt to adopt MT into this application domain so
that . Based on the properties of this application domain, these metamorphic relations
are supposed to be used for further testing in the family of code obfuscators.
Because testing resources are not infinite, testers need intelligence and guidance to
understand which pair(s) of test cases should be prioritised. Research into the effec-
tiveness and priority of metamorphic test case pairs will be assessed as the second goal
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in this thesis. Some distance metrics, coverage Manhattan distance (CMD), frequency
Manhattan distance (FMD) and frequency Hamming distance (FHD) [69], are used to
accomplish these research goals.
1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
In this thesis 6 bug reports were generated in 4 real world code obfuscators using the
metamorphic testing method, and a failure was found in a commercial code obfuscator.
These code obfuscators are already on the market, but had they been tested beforehand,
more attention would have been given to conventional testing methods.
In this thesis, two sets of metamorphic relations were constructed to test code
obfuscators, both effectively detected failures in code obfuscators so they will be used
to test other code obfuscators, regardless of the platforms or languages.
The ability and effectiveness of pairs of metamorphic test cases were investigated,
and several distance metrics were used to quantitatively measure any dissimilarity be-
tween them. The results confirm Cao et al.’s findings [10] [11] that good metamorphic
tests yield large distances.
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows: in Chapter 2, code transformation and
metamorphic testing techniques are introduced in the literature review. Chapter 3
presents the metamorphic testing technique used to test code obfuscators. The subject
programs, metamorphic relations, and the results of experiments will be shown. The
effectiveness and priority of metamorphic test case pairs will be reported in Chapter




2.1.1 The Basic of Code Obfuscation
Since software needs more protection for intellectual property pertaining to software,
more effective methods of protection for all software providers have been proposed.
However, increasing the intellectual property while including the source codes of pro-
grams faces the risk of illegal encroaching and tampering [22] [32]. For example, de-
compilation is a technique that attackers often use to produce the source code from a
binary code; a common decompiler for JAVA is Jad [41]. Java class files can easily be
decompiled so that the source code can be retrieved by similar decompilers. Although
some languages are now more complex, more and more tools have been proposed to
decompile and reverse the software.
To prevent the source code from disclosure, Collberg et al. [23] proposed a code
obfuscation technique. In the code obfuscation process, a Program Being Protected
(PBP) is transformed into a difficult-to-read code which hides the real internal logic
of PBP to confuse an attack. Here, even if a program is decompiled, attackers can
8
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only obtain the obfuscated source code, so the real semantic meaning of the program
is still difficult to read.
In 1984, the first International Obfuscated C Code Contest (IOCCC) was held.
The stated goals of this contest include demonstrating the importance of programming
style and illustrating “some of the subtleties of the C language” [24]. The candidates
were required to develop interesting and “hard-to-understand” code, which they did,
even with the simplest C code example. One anonymous entry accomplished the goal
in an obfuscated C program (code A) (Figure 2.1) that can play on the conventional
“hello, world!” program as follows [48] in first IOCCC:
i n t  i ; m a i n ( ) { f o r ( ; i [ " ] < i ; + + i ) { - - i ; } " ] ; r e a d ( ' - ' - ' - ' , i + + + " h e l l \ 
o ,  w o r l d ! \ n " , ' / ' / ' / ' ) ) ; } r e a d ( j , i , p ) { w r i t e ( j / p + p , i - - - j , i / i ) ; } 
Figure 2.1: Code A
Another program (code B) can also print “hello, world”, which is a simple code
that is generally used as an example when learning a programming language. Code A
and B have the same behaviour, but code A is more difficult to read than code B.
#include <s t d i o . h>
main ( )
{
p r i n t f ( ’ ’ h e l l o , world\n ’ ’ ) ;
}
2.1.2 The Techniques of Code Obfuscation
To make a PBP that cannot be understood, many different code obfuscation tech-
niques are used to create a more complex SEV. The introduction to code obfuscation
was presented by Campbell and Philip L. [23], and then Balakrishnan et al. [4] inves-
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tigated general code obfuscation techniques. Byummarising previous works enables
code obfuscation transformations to be classified into three main classes where several
methods can be used to change the internal part of the original program for each
transformation [3] [4] [5] [22] [23] [31] [32] [48] [60].
1) Layout transformation: this includes obscuring the code format; for example,
the identifiers name is obfuscated, the comments or the space and tab are removed,
and some information can be converted or removed so that the source code is changed
into another confused format.
Layout transformation focuses on changing the look of the source code of a program
rather than changing the program semantics. One method of obfuscation methods is to
remove unnecessary blank lines or white spaces to break up the original look. Remov-
ing white spaces makes a program more compact, while another similar transformation
approach is to remove the comments developed by a programmer with an explanatory
source code. Likewise, more bogus comments and white spaces which cannot affect
compiling can be inserted into the original source code to create confusion and misun-
derstanding.
Another method of transformation is to obfuscate the names of identifiers, such as
the names of variables, class and function, because while identifier names should be
meaningful, they are easy to identify, so this transformation can confuse the context
by renaming it; for example, the name of count count num can be changed to ab789.
There are two ways to rename, either change the name of the identifiers randomly,
or rename based on predefined rules such as the opposite meaning or certain induced
names.
This type of obfuscation does not change the semantics of the program, it only
confuses the syntax of the source code, and while it is easily defined and can be
used automatically, it is generally strong enough for code protection. The variables
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and constants of a source code are simple to transform and the original logic is not
changed.
This means the structure of a source code between PBP and SEV is still equivalent
whereas the others aim to obfuscate the original source code of PBP to SEV by varying
extents.
2) Data transformation: In this case the structure of data in a source code can
be converted to a variable representation such that data transformation changes the
variables by techniques like splitting, merging, or converting static data to procedure
data [23].
Data transformation is also divided into storage & encoding data, aggregation
data, and ordering data [9]. A common method of transformation is to change the
encoding of the integer variables to non-standard data representation so as not to reveal
the real value of the variable. However, the values of the intermediate expressions
must correctly compute the real value [31]; such that an integer variable x could be
represented with a random integer a and another random integer b. That is x ′ = a +
b.
Another method of data transformation is to change the lifetimes of the variables
such that a variable x is not globally defined, and after obfuscation it will be changed
to a global variable and used in different functions.
Collberg et al. [23] also discussed splitting up one Boolean or another variable into
more than one variable, so that a variable x will be rewritten to textity variables (y1,
y2, ..., yn); while the number of new variables will affect the potency of obfuscation,
cost has also increased. As well as splitting up one variable, merging more than one
variable into one variable is also used to transform data.
Another popular method is static data convention; since static data is easy to
identify in decompiling, it can be useful to make another program (or function) to dy-
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namically produce the results in order to make the computation process more difficult
to understand.
3) Control transformation: this uses techniques such as adding a dead code and
extending the loop conditions to complicate the source code; whilst the inline method
and the clone method can also be used to affect aggregation, ordering or computations
[23].
These related methods are summarised by Majumdar et al. [46] and are known
as a semantic transformation for the program. There are three main types of control
transformations, aggregation, ordering, and computations.
A common method of aggregation is cloning which is used to make the process
more difficult to understand. Obfuscating a method’s call sites means that different
routines will appear as if they are being called; several different versions of the same
method can generally be constructed with different obfuscations.
There are also many ways of applying loop transformation in aggregation obfusca-
tion to increase complexity; for instance, the “loop unrolling” method duplicates the
body of the loop more than once, and with for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) it will be dupli-
cated for three statements to represent the original loop. Another method called “loop
fission” can change the same loop into several loops with the same iteration space.
These methods for ordering transformations are concerned with the locality of the
source code, programmers generally keep the source code clean and logical so it is
easy to read, but that makes it easy to understand the original semantic structure.
Therefore, some methods applied in obfuscation such as expressions, statements or
loops are designed to confuse the order of the source code.
Computation methods aim to confuse the semantic logic, but they cannot affect
the results of the actual computation, however, there are methods such as dead or
irrelevant code insertion and loop condition extension where some useless code snippet
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can be inserted into the original source code to hide the real semantic purpose of
control-flow.
More researchers are focusing on more complex construction of obfuscation meth-
ods [5] [31] [50] [52], but apart from obfuscation methods, obfuscation techniques are
used to transform the different program stages so that the binary code file and the
source code can be confused [33]. For example, a subject program called “Obfuscator-
LLVM” can output an obfuscated binary code file, whereas others will create an ob-
fuscated source code from the original source code. Both of these levels of obfuscation
can protect the real source code by transforming original source code structure.
In summary, all the code obfuscation techniques focus on confusing a PBP to
make it hard to read, but after being obfuscated, the PBP will be transformed into
a version that is more difficult to understand and the comprehensibility of the code
hides the real purpose of PBP. Several papers indicate that code obfuscation can make
an unintelligible program while maintaining the functionality the same as the original
code. Collberg et al. [23] defined code transformation such that Program P is confused
to P′ by transformation T : P
T
−→ P′ produces the same output as P. More precisely, the
obfuscated program P′ should behave the same as the original program P. Although
there are several kinds of obfuscation, their performance has no effect on their original
behaviour.
2.1.3 The Quality of Code Obfuscators
While code obfuscation has been widely applied to protect software, a type of soft-
ware that can confuse and transform software has been developed; it is called a code
obfuscator. Code obfuscators are used in different platforms to support programming
languages such as C, C++ and JAVA. They now form a family of code obfuscators
known as ProGuard for JAVA code programs, PHPprotect for PHP code programs,
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and Cobfusc for C programs, as well as other commercial software such as Stunnix
for multiple languages. As a tool for obfuscating codes, they have the same goal of
preventing the source code from unwrapping, while hiding the real logic of PBP with
some transformations and keeping the semantic correctness of SEV.
As an obfuscated version, SEV also a publicly released program that represents
the complete executive behaviour of PBP. Therefore, any error of SEV involving code
obfuscation may cause software companies, especially financial companies, to lose a lot
of money, which means code obfuscators must be correct and verify the equivalence
between PBP and SEV.
Technically, code obfuscators create a semantic equivalent version (SEV ) according
to transformation rules from a given input PBP, as shown in Figure 2.2, and then SEV
shares the same set of all possible inputs as PBP. After this, the set of inputs is called
the input domain, and therefore a correct code obfuscator should satisfy two properties.
Firstly, PBP and its SEV perform the same in the whole input domain, and secondly,
a code obfuscator should apply the predefined transformation rules correctly to create
SEV from PBP.
Many famous software providers use code obfuscators to prevent malicious decom-
pilations from attacking the intellectual property of their products. Here it is assumed
that PBP is qualified for the company and then an SEV transformed by a code obfus-
cator will be released onto the market. Any error in SEV may cause heavy losses for
the company, and since the correctness of SEV is affected by code obfuscators, their
quality must be critically verified. To validate a code obfuscator involves human intel-
ligence, especially when automatically verifying the correctness of non-deterministic
transformation rules, and since judging the semantic equivalence between PBP and
SEV is difficult due to constraints in the testing resources, no software can be assumed,
and therefore code obfuscators must be tested systematically.
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…                               
int a;                               
int b;                                  
a  = 0;                                  
b = 1;                          
while (a < 10)                           
{                                          
  b = a + b;                               





…                                         
int m1xyz;  
int m2abc;  
m1xyz = 0;  
m2abc = (0+0*1+1*1+1*0);  
for (;m1xyz < 10; m1xyz++)      






Figure 2.2: The executed process of code obfuscator
2.2 Metamorphic Testing
2.2.1 Basic Concepts of Metamorphic Testing
Testers normally use the expected outputs to verify the correctness of the program
under test and generally assume that the expected outputs actually exist. However,
in some situations there are no the expected outputs or it is very expensive to verify
whether the actual output of a test case is correct; this is called the oracle problem [21].
Verifying this manually or empirically is very time consuming and is prone to error [47].
One famous oracle problem is the shortest path problem, which finds the shortest
path between a start node A and an end node B in an undirected graph [16]. When
a graph is large and complex, there are many paths between A and B and it will be
very expensive and difficult to validate the results. Nevertheless, one property of this
problem can be found, the shortest distance between A and B; there should only be
one, and it should remain unchanged and therefore this property is a metamorphic
relation where the distances of the initial input (A, B) and the follow-up input (B, A)
are checked against the metamorphic relation. If this metamorphic relation has been
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violated, a failure has been found.
Another example is if the oracle problem of an online search engine has been
considered, such as the number of results returned or ranking [13] [70] [71].
The metamorphic testing technique is a property-based approach used to verify
the program against the properties between the inputs and outputs of the multiple
executions. By using the properties of the subject program, testers can automatically
generate follow-up test cases from the initial test cases [8] [19].
Metamorphic testing can be carried out using the following approach; if we assume
p(x) is a program under test, then let us assume T is an initial set of test cases that
include x 1, x 2, ..., xn, where n> 0. We first run p on T and get the corresponding
outputs: p(x 1), p(x 2), ..., p(xn), and to test this further, T is used to generate the
follow-up set of test cases by a metamorphic relation r as the initial set of test cases,




, ..., x ′
n







). We can then checkp(x i) and p(x
′
i
) against r, and if there is any element to
violate r, a failure is detected. Further follow-up test cases can be generated based on
different metamorphic relations and then the target program is validated by comparing
the outputs of the initial and follow-up test cases.
A common example is the trigonometric function problem where for the sine func-
tion, MRs can be constructed based on trigonometric domain knowledge; for example,
sin(x) = sin(x+360) and sin(x) = sin(180-x). To take this example further, let us
take the first MR, so when the sine function is implemented by p(x) the follow-up
test T ′ can be generated from T by r: x = x+ 360. The outputs of the sine function
would be equal on T and T ′, but if the outputs are not the same for any test case,
then a failure has been detected.
A metamorphic test should involve several steps; first, identify the metamorphic
relations based on the properties of the program under test, and then generate follow-
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up test cases from the initial test cases by the existing metamorphic relations and
execute them. Note that there are different executions [26] [29] [30]. Lastly, check the
correctness of the results of the initial and follow-up test cases against the metamorphic
relations [14].
2.2.2 Metamorphic Relations
Note from the sine function testing that there may be more than one metamorphic re-
lation based on the properties of the program under test. However, the fault-detection
capabilities of diverse metamorphic relations differ, so constructing a metamorphic
relation is a critical step in metamorphic testing. Metamorphic relations are generally
designed on the basis of the program under test or are property based [16] [18]; some
methods proposed to construct metamorphic relations will be reviewed.
Liu et al [45] presented a method called the “Composition of Metamorphic Relation”
for constructing new metamorphic relations. Existing metamorphic relations can be
combined by some specific rules to construct more of them, for instance, there are
two independent metamorphic relations MR1 and MR2. MR1 and MR2 would be
“compositable” if the follow-up test cases of MR1 can be used as the initial test cases
of MR2; this extends the construction of metamorphic relations, but it is more cost
effective than the original metamorphic relation.
Identifying a metamorphic relation is a common relationship that makes extensive
use of the identity relationships expected of the target program. However, some other
relationships are also used to construct metamorphic relations. Chen et al. [19] de-
signed beyond identity metamorphic relations and verified the program under test by
comparing the differences between the results. When Zhou et al. [71] investigated to
employ metamorphic testing in online search services testing, they constructed a set
of non-identity metamorphic relations.
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Since there are many methods for construct metamorphic relations, more than one
can be involved in testing, in fact the more diverse the metamorphic relation is, the
more effectively would the program be tested [2] [16] [39]. However, testing resources
are not infinite, so while it is impossible to use all the metamorphic relations, their
prioritisation is important for metamorphic testing [15] [18] [40]. This means that
selecting the most effective ones will effectively test and also increase the chances of
detecting failures.
Asrafi et al. [2] assessed the relationship between coverage and fault detection
by monitoring the coverage of the initial and follow-up test cases. After that, more
distance metrics were also used by Cao et al. [10] [11] to measure the fault detection
capacity. Manhattan distance metrics [69] were employed to measure the distance
between the initial and follow-up test case executions, as well as investigating the
relationship between the effectiveness of metamorphic relations and difference between
the initial and follow-up metamorphic test cases. They also found a strong correlation
between the distance and the fault detecting capability of metamorphic relations which
can be used in their selection.
2.2.3 The Application Domains of Metamorphic Testing
MT has been widely applied in various application domains such as web services and
applications [56]. Metamorphic testing methodology was used in Service Oriented
Applications (SOA) testing [12], WSDL description of web services [20], and online
web search applications [13] [35] [62] [70] [71]. MT has also been adopted to generate
automatic random testing and verify the results; the results reveal that metamorphic
testing is effective at web services and applications testing. MT was also applied in ma-
chine learning algorithms. Murphy et al. [51] constructed the 6 metamorphic relations
which exist in most machine learning applications and found there are a adopted lot
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of real bugs in the three machine learning tools. In the decision support domain, MT
has also been used for testing purposes. Metamorphic testing approach was presented
by Kuo et al to test the decision support systems [42], and in which they found a
bug that had not been detected during conventional testing. MT technology has also
been applied in computer graphics, numerical programs, and other domains such as
compiler testing. Tao et al [63] presented a metamorphic relation called “equivalence
preservation” to generate equivalent test cases (programs). The correctness of compil-
ers can be validated by checking the behaviour of the executable results. A testing
tool called Mettoc was developed to automatically construct equivalent variants. Le
et al [43] also presented two test compilers by using a new method called “equivalence
modulo input” which deletes dead codes and generates a new equivalent input, and
also validates the consistency of the original and new outputs. It is useful for test-
ing a compiler, and indeed it confirmed 147 bugs in GCC and LLVM. In 2014, Vu
et al. [43] proposed a method of removing dead code from test compilers to alleviate
the oracle problem. A C program was compiled as the initial test case and then a
new c program was created as a follow-up test case from the original c program by
randomly removing the unexecuted lines and running the new c program on the same
input. The outputs of the two c programs should be the same otherwise there is a
failure in the compiler. The relationship between the new c program and the original c
program was constructed as a metamorphic relation that can detect bugs in a variety
of compilers. Code obfuscators such as compilers, are also an important tool in code
transformation because they transform the source code into an unreadable file and
binary file, while code obfuscators ship the source code into a file that is difficult to
read, although with some transformation rules. With more and more attention being




This chapter has reviewed the literature on code obfuscation and metamorphic testing.
There are several different methods for code obfuscation and there are many code
obfuscators on the market.
Metamorphic testing can be used in situations where there is either no or very
few test oracles, and it can also be integrated with conventional software testing to
become an effective and complementary testing method. Firstly, we can define some
metamorphic relations based on the properties of the target program, even without
an oracle [21]. Secondly, metamorphic testing can automatically generate follow-up
inputs for further testing. Thirdly, metamorphic relations can be reused after being
defined with similar properties of a product family because they can save costs; and
finally, metamorphic testing is independent of any programming language.
Chapter 3
Metamorphic Testing of Code
Obfuscators
3.1 Subject Programs
In these experiments we chose four real life code obfuscators as a pilot, namely Cobfusc,
Stunnix, Tigress and Obfuscator-LLVM because they are very good at protecting
intellectual software property and at preventing malicious attacks on the source code.
They can all obfuscate C programs and make them difficult to understand for illegal
reuse, but the obfuscators must remain PBP and SEV equivalent. Each program has
its own features as the following descriptions will show.
3.1.1 Cobfusc
Cobfusc is a Linux utility which is an open source code in the package cutils [25]; it
only makes the C source code difficult to reuse. It mainly works on converting the
layout, including every change in the identifier, comment removing and compacting
the white spaces. For instance, option a can change the string to an octal form while
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the variable name can be confused by option c. More options are then used to make
the source code more complicated and prevent it from being reused. However, Cobfusc
does not support the function that affects the internal logic, so it cannot realise the
need for more complicated obfuscation, but it is effective and easy to use for elementary
code obfuscation.
3.1.2 Stunnix
The Stunnix C++ Obfuscator is the only commercial tool involved in these experi-
ments. Stunnix is an advanced tool to solute code obfuscation for languages such as C,
C++ and Perl [59]. In this thesis the CXX-Obfus of Stunnix is involved because it can
obfuscate the C and C++ source code. To make PBP more difficult to understand
and reuse, Stunnix supports more obfuscation functions. A sample of code converting
on the Stunnix website [59] is shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, which represent the
original and confused code respectively. Obviously the identifier names become more
complicated and the layout is also changed by removing the spaces.
As a commercial code obfuscator, Stunnix has been a partner with many famous
companies such as Cisco, Motorola, Siemens and DELL. The code obfuscators sup-
ported by Stunnix work for companies who develop software on many platforms, and
since it is commercial software, a trial version was applied in the experiments.
3.1.3 Tigress
Tigress is another important tool for making the C language more intricate [64]. It was
developed by Christian Collberg, a professor in the Department of Computer Science
at the University of Arizona. Tigress is mainly used in related research work and
while it is not an open-source program, we can download the binary code for different
platforms. Tigress is a virtualiser for C/C++ source code and supports many types
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main( int argc, char * argv[ ] )
{
int j;
char version[ 80] ;
while ( ( j = getopt_helper( argc, argv, "n:o:vV:", ((char)(0x2053+885-0x2360)), ((char)
(0x2368+457-0x24db))) ) != - 1) {
switch ( j) {
case ((char)(0x8f4+4043-0x1851)):
name_wide = MYMIN( atoi( optarg) , 0xff) ;
break;  
Figure 3.1: PBP for Stunnix
main( int za82b547bcb, char * argv[ ] )
{
int z2d29194d43;
char version[ (0x138f+2785-0x1e20)] ;
while ( ( j = zefd3fb4f7d( argc, z6965940303, "n:o:vV:", ((char)(0x2053+885-0x2360)),
((char)(0x2368+457-0x24db))) ) != - (0xc4+9243-0x24de)) {
switch ( j) {
case ((char)(0x8f4+4043-0x1851)):
z1c0ab7cf0c = z048b31e7a8( atoi( optarg) , (0xfec+5036-0x2299)) ;
break;  
Figure 3.2: SEV for Stunnix
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of code transformations, especially control and data transformation. It differs from
other subject programs in that the obfuscations focus on changing the layout such
as the variable name, space and comments. Tigress also supports more complicated
transformations for data-flow and control flow, which means that a failure detected is
related to data transformation by a metamorphic relation. Tigress can also generate
different transformations based on different seeds, and therefore it can generate more
variants for the same transformation.
3.1.4 Obfuscator-LLVM
The last code obfuscator is called Obfuscator-LLVM. LLVM is an important compiler
which has been applied in famous companies such as Apple Inc. and Adobe Systems
Incorporated, etc. The Obfuscator-LLVM is the part of LLVM developed by the
information security group at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western
Switzerland of Yverdon-les-Bains [53]. It is based on the Clang compiler and supports
code transformation. It differs from the other obfuscation tools applied in this thesis
because of the final output. Other obfuscators such as Stunnix for example, generate an
obfuscated code for a further compiling process, but the transformations of Obfuscator-
LLVM occur in the compiling process and the binary output is the obfuscated file. The
obfuscated code cannot be outputted, which means the Clang compiler is necessary.
It is also useful for code obfuscation, but it is difficult to validate correctness because
the obfuscation is invisible. Obfuscator-LLVM currently supports some main function
transformations, including substitution, flatting, and bogus control flow, and in the
future it will support even more features.
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3.2 Metamorphic Relations and Experimental Re-
sults
3.2.1 Metamorphic Relations
A code obfuscator should apply the transformation rules correctly, which means the
input (PBP) to a code obfuscator and the output (SEV ) generated by the code ob-
fuscator should be semantically equivalent and denoted by PBP ≡ SEV. Semantic
equivalence also implies that they should “consistently” produce the same outputs in
the whole input domain. We call this the, “Relation of Behaviour Equivalence(RBE )”,
as shown in Figure 3.3. To simplify the discussion we will use PBP(t) and SEV (t) to
denote the behaviour after executing an input t and PBP and SEV to describe the
behaviour of PBP and SEV for every input in the whole input domain. In this process
we simply assume that the compiler used to compile PBP and SEV is correct, even
though the Compiler also has bugs [66]. Based on these two properties, we constructed
two sets of MRs.
  




* : the behaviour of PBP and SEV for any given input 
Figure 3.3: Relation of Behaviour Equivalence
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Behaviour Equivalence Relations
RBE should hold for any given input program to obf. If PBP ≡ PBP ′, then SEV ≡
SEV ′, implying that RBE also hold in SEV and SEV ′, which is SEV ≡ SEV ′. If
SEV and SEV ′ behave differently for some inputs, i.e. we can find any t which will
trigger SEV (t) 6= SEV ′(t), and a failure was detected.
Three rules are purposed to generate PBP ′ in this thesis, MR1, MR2 and MR3.
MR1: The way to generate PBP ′ in this MR is to use another software S, which can
change PBP but distort its semantic meaning; for example, C preprocessors of GCC
can be used in PBP ′ generation. A program is expanded to an equivalent program after
preprocessing by the inclusion of header files and Macro expansion. PBP ′ generation
can also be implemented by scripts; for example, “If (condition) {do A} else {do B}”
is equivalent to “If (not(condition)) {do B} else {do A}”. Based on this feature of S,







Because more the third party tools are involved in the testing process of MR1,
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including AO and the compiler, more time is needed to diagnose the real reason for
detecting failure, so a more dependable way of improving MR1 was tried.
MR2: The environment variables (EVs) are involved in MR2, but (PBP, EVs)
and (PBP ′, EVs ′) are unchangeable. Code obfuscators are used to generate SEV
and SEV′ respectively based on the different EVs shown in Figure 3.5. If SEV and
SEV′ are not equivalent, then a failure has been detected. This MR can be applied
in conditions such as system setting and multiple platforms, especially when the rule





*EVs: environment variables 
EVs Evs’ 
Figure 3.5: MR2
In MR2, environment variables are used to construct MRs and PBP ′ is generated
with EV(s). This diminishes the effects from third party techniques during the testing
process.
MR3: The code obfuscator under test was used as AO to generate PBP ′ from PBP.
In MR3, the first output SEV 1 of the code obfuscator was used as PBP ′ because the
code obfuscators remain PBP and SEV equivalent, and SEV 1 is also equivalent to
3.2. Metamorphic Relations and Experimental Results 28
PBP. We can repeat the process to generate SEV 2 from SEV 1, and then obtain the
final output SEV n after n time recursion. This MR is also called a “recursive relation”.
If SEV n is not equivalent to SEV 1, there is a possible failure in the code obfuscator.






*in the experiments, n=3 
SEV2 
Figure 3.6: MR3
In MR3, the code obfuscator under test can be used to generate PBP ′.It can be
generated without third party techniques and can reduce the effect of the testing
result. However, this transformation can be repeated, so we can get a different SEV
respectively in each recursion. Therefore, any SEV n (n>2) can be used as a follow-up
output to compare with SEVm (where m>1 & m 6=n) against MR.
Transformation Rule Relations
The second set of MRs is used to validate the transformation rules by comparing the
source codes, especially for non-deterministic rules. This type of MRs is executed
without comparing the behaviour and saves time in compiling and executing. MR4
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is similar to the MR2 involved EVsused in PBP to construct PBP ′. For the number
constants transform function, all the number constants are transformed into random
equivalent expressions. For example, i = 5; is transformed into a random expression
i = (1*1+1+1+1*1+2/2). The expressions for i = 5; are different for each transfor-
mation because of randomness, but i = 5; should be transformed with each EV.
3.2.2 Experimental Results
In these experiments we chose four real world code obfuscators for the C program,
Cobfusc, Stunnix, Tigress and Obfuscator LLVM respectively, and found 6 failures.
Moreover, the two sets of MRs based on two different properties of code obfuscators
were effective at code obfuscators testing. These failures are as follows.
MR1
In MR1, one failure was detected in Tigress (version: Linux x86 64-unstable revision
1676) when PBP ′ was constructed by PBP from AO. Then the data transformation
will result in an error executing on SEV ′ because when the program is run, the if
condition will always be run regardless of any input. Excerpts of PBP, PBP ′, SEV,
SEV ′ and the output are shown in Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8, Figure 3.9, and Figure 3.10.
PBP has two integer variables i and j, each of which is assigned an initial value. If
i is greater than j then i is set to i − 10, otherwise i is set to i + 10, and then the value
of i is printed. In MR1, SEV and SEV ′ were compiled into executable programs and
then executed, which were then run on the same input, and then their outputs were
compared. Figure 3.10 shows that the outputs were different and therefore a failure
was detected in Tigress; it was found that Tigress incorrectly transformed the PBP
statement if(i > j)) into an SEV statement if((int)((i > (long)j+116)-116)). The
if condition should be evaluated as a true or false value in the C language, so if its
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#include <std io .h>
#include <std l ib .h>
int main( in t argc,  char *  argv[ ])
{
    in t i  =  1000;
    in t j ;
    j  =  a to i (argv[1]) ;
    i f ( i  >  j )
       i -=  10;
    e l se
       i  += 10;
    
    p r in t f ("%d\n" ,  i ) ;
}
(a) PBP
#include <std io .h>
#include <std l ib .h>
int main( in t argc,  char *  argv[ ])
{
    in t i  =  1000;
    in t j ;
    j  =  a to i (argv[1]) ;
    i f ( i  <= j )
       i  += 10;
    e l se
       i -=  10;
    p r in t f ("%d\n" ,  i ) ;
}
(b) PBP ′
Figure 3.7: PBP and PBP ′ for Tigress
value is 0, an if branch will be executed, but with a non-zero value, an else branch
will be executed. In SEV the if condition is always evaluated to −115 or −116, so
the if statement of SEV will always take the true branch and the false one will not
be executed. Consequently, when SEV and SEV ′ were compiled and executed on the
same input, they had different outputs, as Figure 3.10 shows.
There is still an arguable issue that failure would be detected by comparing the
outputs of PBP and SEV in the conventional testing method, but it should be found
when taking certain specific inputs and running the false branch. For PBP, only the
i value is less than the j value, and then failure can be found. Thus, MT can still be
applied with the oracle and will be better than conventional testing methods because
it emphasizes the need to test from diverse perspectives.
In the experiments, some simple implementations used as AO were a first attempt;
there are other methods which can be used to generate the equivalent programs, and
they may be involved in further experiments.
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in t main( in t argc ,  char **argv )  
{
long i  ;
in t j  ;
{
megaIni t ( ) ;
i  =  1000L +  116;
j  =  a to i ( (char cons t    *)*(argv  + 1 )) ;
i f ( ( in t ) ( ( i  >  ( long ) j  +  116)  - 116))  {
    i  =  ( i  - (10L + 116))  + 116;
} else {
    i  =  ( i  +  (10L + 116))  - 116;
}
pr in t f ( (char cons t    * /*  __res t r ic t   * / )"%d\n" ,  ( in t ) ( i  - 116) ) ;
 
Figure 3.8: SEV for Tigress
in t main( in t argc ,  char **argv )  
{
long i  ;
in t j  ;
{
megaIni t ( ) ;
i  =  1000L +  116;
j  =  a to i ( (char cons t    *)*(argv  + 1 )) ;
i f ( ( in t ) ( ( i  <= ( long ) j  +  116)  - 116))  {
    i  =  ( i  +  (10L + 116))  - 116;
} else {
    i  =  ( i  - (10L + 116))  + 116;
}
pr in t f ( (char cons t    * /*  __res t r ic t   * / )"%d\n" ,  ( in t ) ( i  - 116) ) ;
 
Figure 3.9: SEV ′ for Tigress
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t igress  - uns table  $gcc  PBP.c
t igress  - uns table  $ . /a .out  15
990
t igress  - uns table  $gcc  PBP\ ’ .c
t igress  - uns table  $ . /a .out  15
990
t igress  - uns table  $gcc  SEV.c
t igress  - uns table  $ . /a .out  15
990
t igress  - uns table  $gcc  SEV\’.c
t igress  - uns table  $ . /a .out  15
1010  
Figure 3.10: The outputs of PBP, PBP ′, SEV and SEV ′
MR2
A failure was found in Obfuscator-LLVM (obfuscator-clang version 3.4). Some pro-
grams have different outputs after multiple transformations, as Figure 3.11(b) and
Figure 3.12 shows. As MR2 states that the outputs should be equivalent when ob-
fuscating at different times for the same PBP. PBP was obfuscated with the same
command line parameters of Obfuscator-LLVM, so the SEVs should have the same
behaviour.
When the outputs were different, a failure was detected. This issue was confirmed
when Clang was used to verify the output of PBP, and the outputs were the same
regardless of the number of times it took to compile PBP. After further investigation,
it was discovered that failure was caused by an uninitialised variable. If there is an
uninitialised variable, the behaviour of SEVs may be different. It was also shown that
the software must have the capability of various inputs, including unusual ones.
MR3
Three failures were detected based on MR3, in Cobfusc and Tigress respectively.
Two failures were also found in Cobfusc (package cutils version 1.6); the first one
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#include <s td io .h>
#include <s td l ib .h>
int  main( in t  argc ,  char  *  argv[ ])  {
in t  i ;
in t  j ;
in t  n  =  694;
i  =  a to i (a rgv[1]) ;
i f (  i>n)
{
i  =  i  +  j ;
}
pr in t f ("%d\n" ,  i ) ;
}
(a) PBP
bui ld  $ . /b in /c lang  PBP.c
bui ld  $ . /a .out  10000022
14195494
bui ld  $ . /b in /c lang  PBP.c
bui  ld  $ . /a .out  10000022
14195494
bui ld  $ . /b in /c lang  PBP.c
bui ld  $ . /a .out  10000022
14195494  
(b) outputs of PBP
Figure 3.11: PBP and outputs of PBP for Obfuscator-LLVM
bui ld $ . /b in /c lang  –mllvm –bcf  –ml lvm –boguscf  - loop=3  PBP.c
bui ld $ . /a .out  10000022
10000022
bui ld $ . /b in /c lang  –mllvm –bcf  –ml lvm –boguscf  - loop=3  PBP.c
bui ld $ . /a .out  10000022
14195494
bui ld $ . /b in /c lang  –mllvm –bcf  –ml lvm –boguscf  - loop=3  PBP.c
bui ld $ . /a .out  10000022
10000022
 
Figure 3.12: The outputs of SEV
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#include <s td io .h>
#include “parse .h”
in t  j  =  1729;  
(a) PBP
%:include <s td io.h>
%:include “\160\141\162\163\145\56\150”
int  j  =  1729;
(b) SEV 3
Figure 3.13: PBP and SEV 3 for Cobfusc
was where a header file name using (include “ ”) in the code was changed to the
octal format with MR3. SEV 3 cannot be compiled successfully after that because the
header file could not be found. For example, the header file name (include “version.h”)
was transformed, as shown in Figure 3.13, and when SEV 3 was compiled, the header
files defined in the project should be loaded. Because the name of header file was
changed, it cannot refer to the header file in the project, so it could not pass through
the compiler. A failure was also detected in Cobfusc.
A second failure was also detected when testing Cobfusc. After multiple transfor-
mations of numerical variants, a whole line of source code was split into a new line. As
Figure 3.14 shows, the length of the original line in the source code was longer after
numerical variant transformation because the numbers were transformed into expres-
sions. In MR3, the second line of SEV 3 was separated into three lines, so the new
lines were not valid for the source code and it could not be compiled; a failure was
also found.
A third failure was found in Tigress, as shown in Figure 3.15. After multiple
transformations the function names clashed, which means Tigress added some a new
functions to construct new SEV 3, and the new function name is the same as the
existing one. A redefinition of the function names will result in unsuccessful compiling.
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1 # include <stdio.h>           
2 int  p  = 20;  
3 int  main( int  argc,  char *  argv[] )  {  
4 int  i ;  
 
1 # include <stdio.h>   
2 int  p  = ( ( (2*(2*1+0)+1)*((1*(1*1+0)+0)*(1*(1*1+0)+0)+0)+(1*(2*1+0)+0))*((1+1)  
3 *((0+1)*(1*1+0)+0)+0)*((1*(1*1+0)+0)*((1+0)**(1*1+0)+0)+0)+0)+((1+2)*(  
4 (2*(1*1+0)+0)*(0+1)+0)+0)) ;  
5 int  main( int  argc,  char *  argv[] )  {  
6 int  I ;  
 
 
Figure 3.14: The failure of Cobfusc
 
2.c:89:6:  error:  redefinit ion of  `m_i  $nit ’  
 void m_i$nit (void) 
     ^ 
2.c:73:6:  note previous def init ion of  `m_i  $nit ’  was here 
void  m_i$nit(void) 
     ^ 
2.c:116:6:  error:  redefinit ion of  ` j_i  $nit ’  
 void j_i$nit (void) 
     ^ 
2.c:73:6:  note previous def init ion of  ` j_i  $nit ’  was here 
void  j_i$nit (void) 
     ^ 
 
Figure 3.15: The failure of Tigress
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MR4
In the experiments a failure was detected in the numerical transformation of Stunnix
(the trial edition of Stunnix CXX-Obfusc 4.2). (Because the output of Obfuscator-
LLVM is executable file rather than source code, this type of MRs was not run on it.)
It was found that some numbers cannot be changed successfully for each EV because
they go against the specifications. The number constants can be transformed into
expressions in which the value is computed the same as the original number. For more
complex obfuscations, a different expression can be generated randomly which means
that a number constant which can be transformed should be changed every time. The
PBP, SEV, and SEV ′ are shown in Figure 3.16 and Figure 3.17.
Stunnix was also tested for other research purposes [65], but no faults were found.
In this thesis the anomaly situation cannot be defined as a fault, but it should still
receive due attention and since Stunnix is commercial software, any failure might result
in costs.
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#include <stdio.h> 
int  j  =  1908;   
int  k  =  1662;    
int  m = 1734;   
int  n =  468;    
int  p =  1046;    
int  q =  613;    
int  main()  {  
int  i  =  1000;  
i f  ( i  > q)  
{  
i  -=  10;  
}  
e lse i f  ( i  < k)  
{  
i  += 10;  
}  
pr intf ("%d\n",  i ) ;  
}  
 
Figure 3.16: PBP for Stunnix
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#include <stdio.h> 
int  j  =  (0x1eb7+3040-0x2323);   
int  k  =  (0x129b+1584-0x124d);    
int  m = (0x791+6578-0x1a7d);   
int  n =  (0xec4+227-0xdd3);    
int  p =  (0x7b4+3551-0x117d);    
int  q =  (0x16fc+819-0x17ca);    
int  main()  {  
int  i  =  (0x186f+1261-0x1974);  
i f  ( i  > q)  
{  
i  -=  (0x6cc+3610-0x14dc);  
}  
e lse i f  ( i  < k)  
{  
i  += (0x221+8486-0x233d);  
}  





int  j  =  (0xcd2+7981-0x248b);   
int  k  =  1662;  
int  m = (0x1372+1577-0x12d5);   
int  n =  (0x1fba+91-0x1e41);    
int  p =  (0x1572+4135-0x2183);    
int  q =  (0x514+7106-0x1e71);    
int  main()  {  
int  i  =  (0xc25+6597-0x2202);  
i f  ( i  > q)  
{  
i  -=  (0x97f+4918-0x1cab);  
}  
e lse i f  ( i  < k)  
{  
i  += (0x93a+5435-0x1e6b);  
}  




Figure 3.17: SEV and SEV ′ for Stunnix
Chapter 4
Effectiveness of Metamorphic Test
Case Pairs
In the previous experiments with code obfuscators, some test case pairs were better at
detecting failures within an MR, whereas failures could not be found when the other
obfuscators were run. In a real world situation, it is possible that only a few test cases
will find the failure. These pairs detecting failure(s) are called “violating Metamor-
phic Group” (violating MGs), while the others are called “non-violating Metamorphic
Group” (non-violating MGs). Further research is needed to investigate whether there
are different characteristics between the violating and the non-violating MGs.
4.1 Distance Metrics
We studied the distance metric of test case pairs as a metric to analyse any differ-
ences between the test case pairs. Following Cao et al. [10] [11], the following 3
distance metrics (initially proposed by Zhou et al. [69]) were used to measure the
(dis)similarity between the initial and follow-up executions: the coverage Manhattan
distance (CMD), the frequency Manhattan distance (FMD), and the frequency Ham-
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ming distance (FHD).
Suppose x is an initial test case and let X = x1, x2, ..., xn be the execution
information of the initial test case x, for i = 1, 2, 3, .., n, where n is the total number
of statements (or function or branch). If a statement or a branch has been executed
once or more times, the value of xi is set to 1; otherwise it is 0. Let X










| xi − x
′
n
|, where the values of xi and x
′
i
(i = 1, 2, ..., n) are either 1 or
0. Then, given X = (0, 1, 1, 0) and X ′ = (1, 1, 0, 0). X means that statement( or
function or branch) 1 is not executed, statement(or function or branch) 2 is executed,
statement(or function or branch) 3 is executed, and statement(or function or branch) 4
is not executed. The information given indicates that the number means the statement
(or function or branch) is or is not covered. We do not care whether it is covered once
or more times, as long as it is “covered”. Base on the definition of CMD, we have:
CMD(X,X ′) = |0-1| + |1−1| + |1−0| +|0+0|= 1 + 0 + 1 + 0 = 2. When the branches
are executed, it is named BCMD, but when the statements are executed it is named








be the execution information of the initial test case x and the follow-up
test case x′ where n is the total number of statements(or function or branch). xi and
x′
i
are the execution number (frequency) of statement i executed by the corresponding
test case, for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n. Then FMD compares each (xi, x
′
i
) and sums up the
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|. When branches are executed, it is
named BFMD, but when statements are executed, it is named SFMD. Another metric
concerned with the frequency of how many (xi, x
′
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the number of times that a statement or branch has been executed, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
When branches are executed, it is named BFHD, but when statements are executed
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it is named SFHD.
4.2 Subject Programs
4.2.1 Cobfusc
Cobfusc is described in Chapter 3.
4.2.2 Gzip
Gzip (GNU zip) is a common utility designed for compression; it is frequently used to
compress, and it is also used to uncompress. A file (or some files) should be compressed
correctly and should be restored to a whole and infallible file (or files). Therefore, the
quality of Gzip should be verified.
The options of Gzip which are copied from Gzip(http://www.gnu.org/) [34] are as
follows:
“–stdout/–to-stdout/-c Write output on standard output; keep original files un-
changed. If there are several input files, the output consists of a sequence of indepen-
dently compressed members. To obtain better compression, concatenate all input files
before compressing them.”
“–decompress/–uncompress/-d Decompress.”
“–force/-f Force compression or decompression even if the file has multiple links or the
corresponding file already exists, or if the compressed data is read from or written to
a terminal. If the input data is not in a format recognized by gzip, and if the option
–stdout is also given, copy the input data without change to the standard output: let
zcat behave as cat. If -f is not given, and when not running in the background, gzip
prompts to verify whether an existing file should be overwritten.”
“–help/-h Print an informative help message describing the options then quit.”
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“–keep/-k Keep (dont delete) input files during compression or decompression.”
“–list/-l For each compressed file, list the following fields: compressed size, uncom-
pressed size, ratio and uncompressed name.”
“–license/-L Display the gzip license then quit.”
“–no-name/–n When compressing, do not save the original file name and time stamp
by default.”
“–name/-N When compressing, always save the original file name and time stamp; this
is the default.”
“–quiet/-q Suppress all warning messages.”
“–recursive/-r Travel the directory structure recursively. If any of the file names spec-
ified on the command line are directories, gzip will descend into the directory and
compress all the files it finds there (or decompress them in the case of gunzip).”
“–fast/–best/-n Regulate the speed of compression using the specified digit n, where
-1 or –fast indicates the fastest compression method (less compression) and –best or
-9 indicates the slowest compression method (optimal compression). The default com-
pression level is -6 (that is, biased towards high compression at expense of speed).”
4.3 Metamorphic Relations
4.3.1 MRs of Cobfusc
The MRs of Cobfusc are described in Chapter 3.
4.3.2 MRs of Gzip
In the metamorphic testing literature, the diversity of metamorphic relations is effec-
tive for the program under test. Therefore, the identity and non-identity are both
considered in constructing the MRs of Gzip. MR1, MR2, MR3, MR4 and MR5 rep-
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resent an equivalent relation between the initial and follow-up test cases. MR6 and
MR7 compared the initial and follow-up test cases for the less than and greater than.
These MRs were constructed based on the knowledge of Gzip options, as shown below.
MR1: gzip file and gzip -c file should have the same output file.
MR2: When a file A is compressed to the file B.gz. When B.gz is decompressed to
file C, C should be same as file A.
MR3: −6 is the default compression level. The outputs with −6 and without this
option should be same.
MR4: −q is to control if the waring messages will be printed. The outputs with or
without this option should be the same.
MR5: 1 equals to fast which indicates the fastest method of compression, so their
outputs should have the same ratio.
MR6: With the default compression level, the output file should have a compression
ratio, and then the output file should have a lower compression ratio with a random
number selected from 1 to 5.
MR7: With the default compression level, the output file should have a compression
ratio, and then the output file should have a higher compression ratio with a random
number selected from 7 to 9.
4.4 Experimental Results
4.4.1 Experimental Results of Cobfusc
An independent t test was conducted to compare the means of the two different test
case pair sets for each distance metric, shown in Table 4.1. An independent t test’s Sig
value that is less than or equal to 0.05 indicates a significant difference between the two
variables. The cells with values lower than 0.05 are highlighted, thus indicating that
4.4. Experimental Results 44
violating MGs non-violating MGs
t Sig
mean SD mean SD
BCDM 5.714 2.22 4.576 2.57 -5.268 < 0.05
BFHD 89.43 1.67 89.40 1.26 -0.245 > 0.05
BFMD 7421.33 2359.23 7310.44 2970.20 -0.463 > 0.05
SCMD 8.95 4.067 7.08 4.63 -4.767 < 0.05
SFHD 129.29 1.396 129.22 1.397 -0.536 > 0.05
SFMD 11014.07 3424.86 11021.05 4425.74 0.020 > 0.05
Table 4.1: Independent t test results of Cobfusc
the difference between the violating MGs and the non-violating MGs was statistically
significant for BCMD and SCMD. The distributions of distance metrics are shown as
follows.
Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 presents
the distribution of violating MGs and non-violating MGs for the distance metrics in
Cobfusc testing (0:non-violating MGs; 1:violating MGs). It was observed there was
no large difference between the violating MGs’ distribution and non-violating MGs’
distribution for BFMD and SFMD, whereas BFHD and SFHD also had a similar
distribution. However, the violating MGs’ distribution was greater than the non-
violating MGs’ for BCMD and SCMD.
4.4.2 Experimental Results of Gzip
A set of 500 initial test cases were used in the experiments, including 50 test cases
in the Gzip package and 450 test cases generated randomly. In these experiments,
the same number of follow-up test cases were generated from the initial test cases to
test Gzip for each MR. The Gzip package used in the thesis was downloaded from the
Software-artifact Infrastructure Repository (SIR, http://sir.unl.edu) [28] and the size
of the program was approximately 5,680 LOC. Some default faults had been activated















Figure 4.2: SCMD of Cobfusc
















Figure 4.4: SFMD of Cobfusc














Figure 4.6: SFHD of Cobfusc
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to create the 5 faulty programs used in the thesis. Furthermore, an independent t
test was carried out to compare the mean value and sig value of violating MGs and
non-violating MGs for each distance metric in the Gzip experiments. The results are
shown in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3.
In Table 4.2, MR1, MR2, ..., MR7 represent 7 MRs, and F and NF refer to the
violating MGs and the non-violating MGs. The value of each table cell indicates the
mean value of the corresponding distance metric. The Sig values are shown in Table
4.3.
Table 4.2 shows that the mean values of the violating MGs were greater than the
non-violating MGs for BCMD and SCMD, whereas there was no regularity between
the two MGs for the other distance metrics. This finding is consistent with previous
observations that the BCMD and SCMD are often better than other distance metrics
in Cobfusc testing. An independent t test’s Sig value that is less than or equal to 0.05
indicates a significant difference between the two variables. In Table 4.3 the cells with
values lower than 0.05 are highlighted, thus indicating that the difference between the
violating MGs and the non-violating MGs was statistically significant.
The distribution of violating MGs and non-violating MGs of Gzip are also presented
in Figure 4.7, Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9, Figure 4.10, Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 for MR1.
Although the difference for BCMD and SCMD between violating MGs distribution
and non-violating MGs distribution for Gzip was not greater than Cobfusc, there were
significant differences from the other distance metrics distribution. Indeed Figure 4.7
and Figure 4.8 shows that BCMD is better than SCMD at representing fault-detection
and is also found that coverage based metrics are more effective than frequency-based
metrics [69].
It was also observed that all the MRs detected failure, but this does not mean
that the MRs constructed during testing can find all the failures and that all the MRs
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BCMD BFHD BFMD SCMD SFHD SFMD
MR1
F 98.03 90.12 85553 568.14 325.80 76125
NF 94.18 90.16 99295 494.35 326.01 87173
MR2
F 113.56 89.56 85162 520.16 320.11 87173
NF 103.08 88.99 83729 510.98 220.19 97276
MR3
F 106.14 92.60 91743 532.18 318.77 101123
NF 88.72 93.14 91635 532.10 322.87 98972
MR4
F 120.36 92.16 58961 487.90 318.90 87276
NF 97.03 92.50 99135 488.01 319.11 93817
MR5
F 100.31 95.88 93618 499.54 365.11 73763
NF 96.08 96.01 87361 487.15 366.00 87261
MR6
F 97.14 93.42 107361 500.33 366.00 98271
NF 89.00 94.00 99732 499.52 338.00 98272
MR7
F 102.13 90.04 72718 511.37 324.97 108287
NF 97.77 90.03 87261 510.27 325.09 117272
*F: violating MGs
*NF: non-violating MGs
Table 4.2: Mean value of distance metrics of violating MGs and non-violating MGs
can be effective in detecting failure. Therefore, a diversity of MRs should be used to
improve the testing coverage.
It can be concluded that distance metrics can describe the effectiveness of MGs
and there is a difference between violating MGs and non- violating MGs, and this
difference was statistically significant across all the subject programs. In other words,
the coverage metric can reflect MGs fault-detection capability and can also be used to
select metamorphic test case pairs.
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MR1 MR2 MR3 MR4 MR5 MR6 MR7
BCMD 0.019 0.011 0.029 0.031 0.038 0.041 0.022
BFHD 0.154 0.225 0.657 0.118 0.357 0.227 0.226
BFHD 0.716 0.592 0.847 0.691 0.277 0.321 0.305
SCMD 0.059 0.031 0.037 0.064 0.028 0.043 0.036
SFHD 0.881 0.602 0.595 0.091 0.189 0.226 0.158
SFMD 0.216 0.411 0.381 0.115 0.989 0.441 0.343







Figure 4.7: BCMD of Gzip
















Figure 4.9: BFMD of Gzip
















Figure 4.11: BFHD of Gzip









Figure 4.12: SFHD of Gzip
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Metamorphic testing is a practical approach to improve the cost effectiveness of testing
and as such has been applied in various application domains, either with or without
an oracle. MRs are identified from the expected properties of the target program, and
the follow-up test cases for each MR can be generated automatically from the initial
test cases.
Code obfuscation is a popular approach for protecting software and preventing
malicious attacks for illegal purposes. Major companies use code obfuscation software,
called code obfuscators, to protect their software. Like compilers, the correctness of
code obfuscators is critical for the correctness of the final software products released
onto the market, and therefore the quality of code obfuscators is a determining factor.
In this thesis we focused on code obfuscator testing and used MT for this purpose.
Two sets of MRs were constructed from the key properties of code obfuscators, and the
behaviour equivalence and transformation rules were both verified. In the experiments,
MT detected 6 previously unknown bugs in real world code obfuscators.
The first type of MR detected 6 bugs in the 4 real world obfuscators. These were
implemented using the concept of RBE, which is the key property of code obfuscation.
The behaviour of PBP and SEV should be equivalent to any obfuscation rule so it
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can be used regardless of whether single or multiple obfuscation rules are applied.The
second type of MR focused on the transformation rules. Although they could be
verified manually, human intelligence is still needed and therefore manual verification
is expensive and prone to error.
Code obfuscators have common functions so the systematic testing method is nor-
mally applicable for reuse in other related code obfuscation tools. The results reported
in this thesis show that MT is effective at code obfuscator testing.
We also studied the nature of effective metamorphic test case pairs by using dis-
tance metrics to measure the (dis)similarity between the initial and follow-up test case
executions. Our results provide hints for the selection and/or prioritisation of MRs
and metamorphic test cases. Because testing resources are not infinite, a method for
selecting or prioritising metamorphic test case pairs should be considered, i.e., it is
important to know which metamorphic test case pairs should be given priority in soft-
ware testing. In this thesis it was found that the pairs with a large coverage distance
have a higher chance at detecting failure(s). This observation confirms the findings
first reported by Cao et al. [10] [11]. Our findings can be used in situations where
the initial and follow-up test case execution differences are known or can be estimated
(such as in the context of regression testing). It is possible in future research to adopt
other variables or metrics to further study the prioritisation and selection of MRs and
metamorphic test cases.
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